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Abstract. The paper reports on some results concerning A˚qvist’s dyadic
logic known as system G, which is one of the most influential logics for
reasoning with dyadic obligations (“it ought to be the case that . . . if it is
the case that . . . ”). Although this logic has been known in the literature
for a while, many of its properties still await in-depth consideration. In
this short paper we show: that any formula in system G including nested
modal operators is equivalent to some formula with no nesting; that the
universal modality introduced by A˚qvist in the first presentation of the
system is definable in terms of the deontic modality.
1 Introduction
Modern research into the use of deontic logic to represent and reason with nor-
mative statements began with the introduction in [10] of what has become known
as standard deontic logic (SDL). SDL is based on a propositional language and
uses modal operators for obligation and permission where, intuitively, Oϕ means
that it ought to be the case (or, it is obligatory) that the formula ϕ be true, and
as the dual, Pϕ means it is permitted that the formula ϕ be true.
Dyadic deontic logic (DDL) was introduced in [11] to cater for paradoxes in
SDL resulting from so-called contrary-to-duty obligations as described in [3]. In
DDL, dyadic modal operators (adapted from the conventions used to express
conditional probabilities) enable modal formulae to express the conditions in
which obligations and permissions apply so that, for example, O(ϕ|ψ) means
that it is obligatory that the formula ϕ be true, provided or given that ψ is true.
The standard semantics used for DDL were introduced by Hansson in [5],
who imposes restrictions on the language such that modal operators cannot be
nested and mixed formulae (connecting modal and propositional formulae) are
not permitted.
In [1], A˚qvist proposes system G, a system of dyadic deontic logic which
extends Hansson’s logic with a universal necessity operator . Intuitively ϕ
means that the formula ϕ is necessarily true (and the dual ♦ϕ means the formula
ϕ is possibly true).4
4 [1] uses the operators N(necessarily) and M(maybe), but we have opted for the
standard ‘box’ and ‘diamond’ normally used with alethic logics and consistent with
other recent authors such as Parent (for example, in [8]).
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We present an interesting property of System G, namely that every formula
with nested O and  operators is equivalent to another formula without any
nesting. It has already been established that this is the case for S5 logics in [7].
In System G, the  operator is an S5 operator and it therefore follows from
[7] that nestings of the  are superfluous. The O operator however presents
additional challenges as the nesting may occur within either argument of the
operator. We can still prove that despite this, nestings of the O operator and of
combinations of the O and  operator are superfluous. These results provide an
a posteriori justification to Hansson’s original syntactic restrictions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some
preliminaries including the syntax, semantics and proof theory of System G. In
Section 3 we show our main result that every System G formula with nested
O and  operators is equivalent to another formula without any nesting. We
do this using both a semantic and a syntactic argument. As part of the proof,
we also show that in System G, all -formulae can be expressed using the O
modality only. We conclude in In Section 4. Longer proofs of the lemmas and
theorems are provided in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Some background on nesting deontic operators
The issue of whether deontic logic formalisms should allow operators to be nested
within the scope of others has been considered as early as in [6]. Sentences in
which deontic operators are nested are sentences like (taken from [6]):
– It is obligatory that it is obligatory that everyone keeps his promises.
– It ought to be the case that what ought to be the case is the case.
The issue, from a deontic logic point of view, is whether statements such as the
above ones should be objects in a logic or should rather be ignored (on different
bases such as being non-meaningful, or trivial or uninteresting).
As pointed out in [4] (quoted in [12]), little attention was initially paid to
nested modalities. In [11], von Wright defines the language of both his original
and dyadic systems to exclude nesting with no explicit discussion of why this
should be the case. Hansson in [5] follows this tradition and also explicitly for-
bids nesting in his language, commenting however that despite this restriction
“almost all philosophical problems discussed in connection with deontic logic
are expressible”. In [1], A˚qvist identifies nesting as one of the differences be-
tween Hansson’s language and his proposed System G but does not discuss any
implications of this difference.
Some work has been done on the representation and meaning of nested modal-
ities in some normative systems, such as in so-called stit logics in [2]. However,
despite the fact that it is considered a powerful logic for handling contrary-to-
duty obligations, to the best of our knowledge, no research has been done on
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nested modalities in System G. In this paper we aim to address this and provide
a technical answer to the issue of nesting (within System G).
Results of this type are well-known for normal monadic modal logics (e.g.,
for S5 [7]). In System G, the  operator is an S5 operator and it therefore
follows from [7] that nestings of the  are superfluous. The O operator however
presents additional challenges as the nesting may occur within either argument
of the operator. We prove that despite this, nestings of the O operator and of
combinations of the O and  operator are superfluous.
2.2 Language, Syntax and Semantics of System G
Language Formally the language of system G is defined thus
Definition 1 (Language of System G). Let P be a set of propositional atoms.
The language of system G, L is defined by the following inductive syntax, where
p ∈ P and ϕ ∈ L
L : p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | O(ϕ|ϕ) | ϕ
Conjunction, material implication and biconditional are defined from nega-
tion and disjunction in the expected way. We treat ⊤ as a propositional atom in
P, and define ⊥ as ¬⊤. Parentheses may be used to clarify the order of operators.
O(ϕ1|ϕ2) is read as ‘ϕ1 is obligatory, given ϕ2’. ϕ is read as ‘Everywhere ϕ’.
It follows that the duals of these operators P(‘Permitted’) and ♦(‘Somewhere’)
are defined as follows:
P(ϕ1|ϕ2) =def ¬O(¬ϕ1|ϕ2)
♦ϕ =def ¬¬ϕ
Semantics These formulae are evaluated using Kripke-style possible world se-
mantics based on the so-called class of Strong H3 models defined by A˚qvist in
[1] as follows:
Definition 2 (Strong H3 model). Given a set of propositional atoms P, a
Strong H3 model M is a structure 〈S,4,V〉, where
– S is a non-empty set of possible worlds
– 4 is a reflexive, transitive, fully connected and limited (see below) binary
relation over S that satisfies the limit assumption condition described below.
– V is a valuation function V : P → ℘(S) that assigns a truth set to every
proposition in P.
The weak preference relation 4 captures the idea that for any two worlds t
and s, if t 4 s then s is at least as good as t. The relation is fully connected if
and only if any two worlds in S are comparable, or formally that:
∀s, t ∈ S, s 4 t or t 4 u (1)
The limitedness property can be characterised in terms of the opt function,
defined as follows.
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Definition 3 (opt function).
opt(X) = {x ∈ X | ∀y ∈ X : y 4 x} (2)
Intuitively, opt(X) are the elements of X that are at least as good as any
other element in X . We say that opt(X) is the optimal set or the set of optimal
elements of X.
The preference relation < is then limited if and only if for every non-empty
subset of S there is at least one optimal element, or formally:
∀X ⊆ S, if X 6= ∅ then opt(X) 6= ∅ (3)
Definition 4 (Truth at a point). The notion of a formula ϕ ∈ L being true
at a world s in a model M = 〈S,4,V〉, denoted M, s |= ϕ, is defined inductively
as follows:
M, s |= ⊤ (4)
M, s |= p⇐⇒ s ∈ V(p) (5)
M, s |= ¬ϕ⇐⇒ not M, s |= ϕ (6)
M, s |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ⇐⇒M, s |= ϕ1 or M, s |= ϕ2 (7)
M, s |= O(ϕ1 | ϕ2)⇐⇒ opt(Jϕ2K) ⊆ Jϕ1K (8)
M, s |= ϕ⇐⇒ ∀(t ∈ S)M, t |= ϕ (9)
(JϕK denotes the truth set of ϕ, i.e. the set of worlds in which ϕ is true.)
The truth definitions for P (the dual of O) and ♦(the dual of ), derived
from (8) and (9) are as follows:
M, s |= P(ϕ1 | ϕ2)⇐⇒ opt(Jϕ2K) ∩ Jϕ1K 6= ∅ (10)
M, s |= ♦ϕ⇐⇒ ∃(t ∈ S)M, t |= ϕ (11)
We say that a formula ϕ is valid in Strong H3 models if it is true in all
worlds of all Strong H3 models, and denote this |=H3 ϕ. (We sometimes drop
the subscript if the class of models being referred to is clear.) If ϕ is valid with
respect to a class of models, we say that ϕ is a validity of that class of models.
We say that two formulae ϕ and ψ are semantically equivalent if ϕ ↔ ψ is a
validity.
Observation 1 The modalities O and , as well as their duals, are global
modalities in the following sense:
∃s ∈ S :M, s |= O(ϕ | ψ) iff ∀t ∈ S,M, t |= O(ϕ | ψ)
∃s ∈ S :M, s |= ϕ iff ∀t ∈ S,M, t |= ϕ
Note that, as a consequence, for a formula of the form O(ϕ|ψ) in any model
M = 〈S,4,V〉, we either have JO(ϕ|ψ)K = S or JO(ϕ|ψ)K = ∅. Likewise for the
other modalities.
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Axiomatics A˚qvist proposes the following axioms and rules for system G
(names are from [8]).
All propositional tautologies (PL)
S5 axioms for  (S5)
P(ϕ|ψ)↔ ¬O(¬ϕ|ψ) (DfP)
O(ϕ1 → ϕ2|ψ)→ (O(ϕ1|ψ)→ O(ϕ2|ψ)) (COK)
O(ϕ|ψ)→ O(ϕ|ψ) (Abs)
ϕ→ O(ϕ|ψ) (CON)
(ψ1 ↔ ψ2)→ (O(ϕ|ψ1)↔ O(ϕ|ψ2)) (Ext)
O(ϕ|ϕ) (Id)
O(ϕ|ψ ∧ χ)→ O(χ→ ϕ|ψ) (C)
♦(ψ)→ (O(ϕ|ψ)→ P(ϕ|ψ)) (D*)
P(ϕ|ψ) ∧O(ϕ→ χ|ψ)→ O(χ|ϕ ∧ ψ) (S)
If ⊢ ϕ and ⊢ ϕ→ ψ then ⊢ ψ (MP)
If ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ ϕ (N)
We refer to this axiom system as system G, and so we say that a formula
ϕ is derivable in system G if it can be derived using this calculus. We denote
this by ⊢G ϕ. (For readability, we sometimes drop the subscript if the system
referred to is clear). If ϕ is derivable in system G, we say that ϕ is a theorem of
system G. We say that two formulae ϕ and ψ are provably equivalent if ϕ↔ ψ
is a theorem of System G.
Parent [8] shows that this axiom system is sound and strongly complete with
respect to Strong H3 models.
3 Nested formulae
In this section we present our main finding that any system G formula which
contains nested modal operators is equivalent to some other formula without
nesting. We present a semantic and a syntactic argument for this theorem.
Both arguments use the following definitions and lemma.
Definition 5 (Modal depth). The modal depth md(ϕ) of a formula ϕ ∈ L is
defined inductively as
md(⊤) = 0
md(p) = 0, ∀p ∈ P
md(¬ϕ) = md(ϕ)
md(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = max(md(ϕ1),md(ϕ2))
md(O(ϕ1|ϕ2)) = 1 +max(md(ϕ1),md(ϕ2))
md(ϕ) = 1 +md(ϕ)
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where max represents the arithmetic maximum, i.e. for any x, y ∈ N, if x ≥ y
then max(x, y) = x, otherwise max(x, y) = y.
Definition 6 (Unnested disjunctive normal form (UDNF)). Let LO be
the sublanguage of L without formulae containing the -operator. We say that
a formula ψ ∈ LO is in Unnested Disjunctive Normal Form (UDNF) if it is a
disjunction of conjunctions of the form
δ = α∧O(ϕ1 | ψ1)∧· · ·∧O(ϕn | ψn)∧¬O(ϕn+1 | ψn+1)∧· · ·∧¬O(ϕn+k | ψn+k)
where n, k ∈ N and all of the formulae α, ϕm, ψm (m ≤ n+ k) are propositional
formulae (⊤ and ⊥ are considered propositional formulae). The formula δ is
called a canonical conjunction and the formulae O(ϕm | ψm) are called prenex
formulae.
Observe that by the above definition, formulae in UDNF have a maximum
modal depth of 1.
The following lemma from [7] guarantees that a prenex formula within a
formula in UDNF can always be moved to the outermost level.
Lemma 1. (Meyer and van der Hoek [7] Lemma 1.7.6.2) If ψ is in UDNF
and contains a prenex formula σ, then ψ is equivalent to a formula of the form
pi ∨ (λ ∧ σ) where pi, λ and σ are all in UDNF.
Proof. ψ is in UDNF so ψ = δ1 ∨ δ2 ∨ · · · ∨ δm where all the δi’s are canonical
conjunctions. Suppose σ occurs in δm. As σ is one of the conjuncts of δm, δm
can be written as λ ∧ σ, where λ collects the remaining conjuncts in δm (or
⊤ if δm = σ). Taking pi to be (δ1 ∨ δ2 ∨ · · · ∨ δm−1) gives the desired result
ψ = pi ∨ (λ ∧ σ).
3.1 Semantic argument
First we state the following proposition which provides a means to obtain for
every -formula, a semantically equivalent O-formula.
Proposition 1.
|= ϕ↔ O(⊥|¬ϕ) (12)
The following lemma guarantees that an O or ¬O formula within the scope
of another can be brought out of that scope.
Lemma 2. Let Oˆ stand for an arbitrary but fixed O(ϕ′|ψ′) formula.
|= O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)))↔ ((Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ)) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi)) (13)
|= O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ ¬Oˆ)))↔ ((¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ)) ∨ (Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi)) (14)
|= O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ)↔ ((Oˆ ∧O(pi ∨ λ|ψ)) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(pi|ψ))) (15)
|= O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ ¬Oˆ)|ψ)↔ ((¬Oˆ ∧O(pi ∨ λ|ψ)) ∨ (Oˆ ∧O(pi|ψ))) (16)
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We can now state our main theorem as follows.
Theorem 1. For every formula χ ∈ L, there exists a formula χ′ such that χ′ is
in UDNF and |= χ↔ χ′
3.2 Syntactic argument
The syntactic argument has the same structure as the semantic argument with
Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 replaced by syntactic counterparts.
The following is a syntactic counterpart to Proposition 1.
Proposition 2.
⊢ ϕ↔ O(⊥|¬ϕ) (17)
The following is a syntactic counterpart to Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. Let Oˆ stand for an arbitrary but fixed O(ϕ′|ψ′) formula.
⊢ O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)))↔ ((Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ)) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi)) (18)
⊢ O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ ¬Oˆ)))↔ ((¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ)) ∨ (Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi)) (19)
⊢ O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ)↔ ((Oˆ ∧O(pi ∨ λ|ψ)) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(pi|ψ))) (20)
⊢ O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ ¬Oˆ)|ψ)↔ ((¬Oˆ ∧O(pi ∨ λ|ψ)) ∨ (Oˆ ∧O(pi|ψ))) (21)
Theorem 2. Every formula χ is provably equivalent to a formula in UDNF.
Proof. The proof is by induction on χ using the same argument as the proof
for Theorem 1 except that Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 are replaced by their
syntactic counterparts Proposition 2 and Lemma 3 respectively.
4 Conclusion
When he introduced restrictions on nesting and in [5],Hansson commented that
in SDL, despite these restrictions, “almost all philosophical problems discussed
in connection with deontic logic are expressible in his language.” He, however,
offers no justification for this conjecture and, in moving from SDL to the dyadic
language, a formal definition of the dyadic language used in not given, and it is
not explicit whether these restrictions are to be kept. It is generally considered
that it was his intention that the dyadic language be so restricted, and this is
stated explicitly, for example, in [9]. We note also that the list of example valid
and invalid formulae given in [5] contain no nested formulae.
From a technical point of view, it seems unnatural to forbid certain opera-
tors to appear in the scope of others. The main goal of our work has been to
see whether such a restriction is necessary, and whether it actually limits the
ability of the system to express deontic concepts. We have demonstrated that
the answer to both questions is negative: forbidding nested modalities is not
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technically needed, and, on the other hand, not allowing them does not restrict
the expressive power of the language either. This in some sense settles Hansson’s
conjecture, at least with respect to system G: if any interesting problems can be
expressed in the full dyadic language, they also can in a restricted version where
nesting is not permitted.
References
[1] L A˚qvist. Some results on dyadic deontic logic and the logic of preference.
Synthese, 66:95–110, 1986.
[2] N Belnap and P Bartha. Marcus and the problem of nested deontic modal-
ities. In Modality, morality, and belief: essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan
Marcus, pages 174–197. 1995.
[3] R M Chisholm. Contrary-to-duty imperatives and deontic logic. Analysis,
24(2):33–36, 1963.
[4] L F Goble. The iteration of deontic modalities. Logique Et Analyse, 9:
197–209, 1966.
[5] B Hansson. An Analysis of some Deontic Logics. Nouˆs, 3(4):373–398, 1969.
[6] R B Marcus. Iterated deontic modalities. Mind, 75(300):580–582, 1966.
[7] J-J Ch. Meyer and W van der Hoek. Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer
Science (Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science). Cambridge
University Press, 1995. ISBN 0511569858.
[8] X Parent. On the Strong Completeness of A˚qvist’s Dyadic Deontic Logic
G. In DEON, pages 189–202, 2008.
[9] W Spohn. An analysis of Hansson’s dyadic deontic logic. Journal of Philo-
sophical Logic, 4:237–252, 1975.
[10] G H von Wright. Deontic Logic. Mind, 60(237):1–15, 1951.
[11] G H von Wright. A New System of Deontic Logic. In R Hilpinen, editor,
Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, pages 105–120. D.
Reidel, 1964.
[12] H Wansing. Nested deontic modalities: Another view of parking on high-
ways. Erkenntnis, 46:185–199, 1998.
A Note on Nesting in Dyadic Deontic Logic 9
APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. From left to right:
Assume that for an arbitrary strong h3 model M and world s, M, s |= ϕ.
Therefore, by the truth definition of  (9), ∀(t ∈ S)M, t |= ϕ.
Therefore, there are no ¬ϕ-worlds, so J¬ϕK = ∅.
Therefore, by the definition of opt (2) opt(J¬ϕK) = ∅ ⊆ J⊥K.
Therefore , by the truth definition of O (8), M, s |= O(⊥|¬ϕ).
From right to left:
Assume M, s |= O(⊥|¬ϕ).
Therefore, by the truth definition of O (8), opt(J¬ϕK) ⊆ J⊥K.
Therefore, as J⊥K = ∅, opt(J¬ϕK) = ∅.
Therefore, given the limit assumption (3), J¬ϕK = ∅.
Therefore ∀(t ∈ S)M, t |= ϕ.
Therefore, by the truth definition of  (9), M, s |= ϕ.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. To prove (13):
(Note that (14) can be proved using a similar argument, replacing Oˆ with ¬Oˆ.)
From left to right:
Let M = 〈S,4,V〉 be a model, and let s ∈ S.
Assume M, s |= O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)))
Therefore, by (8), opt(
r
pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)
z
) ⊆ JϕK. Call this (A).
Given Observation 1, there are two cases: Either ∀t ∈ S,M, t |= Oˆ or ∀t ∈
S,M, t |= ¬Oˆ.
If ∀t ∈ S, M, t |= Oˆ
Then
r
pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)
z
= JpiK ∪ (JλK ∩ S) = JpiK ∪ JλK = Jpi ∨ λK
Therefore, given (A), opt(Jpi ∨ λK) ⊆ JϕK
Therefore, by equation (8), M, s |= O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ)
Therefore, given that M, s |= Oˆ, M, s |= (Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ))
Therefore, M, s |= (Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ)) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi))
If ∀t ∈ S, M, t |= ¬Oˆ:
Then
r
pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)
z
= JpiK ∪ (JλK ∩ ∅) = JpiK
Therefore, given (A), opt(JpiK) ⊆ JϕK
Therefore, by equation (8), M, s |= O(ϕ|pi)
Therefore, given that M, s |= ¬Oˆ, M, s |= (¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi)
Therefore, M, s |= (Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ)) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi))
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From right to left:
Let M = 〈S,4,V〉 be a model, and let s ∈ S
item[] Assume M, s |= O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ) ∧ Oˆ) ∨ (O(ϕ|pi) ∧ ¬Oˆ).
There are two cases. EitherM, s |= O(ϕ|pi∨λ)∧Oˆ orM, s |= O(ϕ|pi)∧¬Oˆ.
If M, s |= O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ) ∧ Oˆ holds:
Then M, s |= O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ) and M, s, |= Oˆ
Given M, s |= O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ), by equation (8) opt(Jpi ∨ λK) ⊆ JϕK. Call this
(B).
By observation 1, ifM, s, |= Oˆ then ∀t ∈ S,M, t |= Oˆ, therefore
r
Oˆ
z
=
S.
Therefore JλK = JλK ∩ rOˆz = rλ ∧ Oˆz
Therefore Jpi ∨ λK = rpi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)z
Therefore, we can substitute
r
pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)
z
for Jpi ∨ λK in (B), getting
opt(
r
pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)
z
) ⊆ JϕK
Therefore, by (8), M, s |= O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)))
If M, s |= O(ϕ|pi) ∧ ¬Oˆ holds:
Then M, s |= O(ϕ|pi) and M, s, |= ¬Oˆ
Given M, s |= O(ϕ|pi), by equation (8) opt(JpiK) ⊆ JϕK. Call this (C).
By observation 1, if M, s, |= ¬Oˆ then ∀t ∈ S,M, t |= ¬Oˆ, thereforer
Oˆ
z
= ∅.
Therefore
r
λ ∧ Oˆ
z
= JλK ∩ rOˆz = ∅
Therefore JpiK = rpi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)z
Therefore, we can subtitute
r
pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)
z
for JpiK in (C), getting opt(rpi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)z) ⊆
JϕK
Therefore, by (8), M, s |= O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)))
To prove (15):
(Note that (16) can be proved using a similar argument, replacing Oˆ with ¬Oˆ.)
From left to right:
We assume that for some arbitrary modelM = 〈S,4,V〉 and arbitrary world
s ∈ S, M, s |= O( (pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))|ϕ )
Therefore, by equation (8), opt(JϕK) ⊆ rpi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)z. Call this (D).
By Observation 1, there are two cases. Either ∀t ∈ S, M, t |= Oˆ or ∀t ∈
S, M, t |= ¬Oˆ.
If ∀t ∈ S, M, t |= Oˆ:
Then
r
Oˆ
z
= S
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Therefore,
r
pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)
z
= JpiK ∪ (JλK ∩ S) = JpiK ∪ JλK = Jpi ∨ λK
Therefore, given (D), opt(JϕK) ⊆ Jpi ∨ λK
Therefore, by equation (8), M, s |= O( (pi ∨ λ)|ϕ )
Therefore, given that M, s |= Oˆ, M, s |= (Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ))
Therefore, M, s |= (Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ)) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi)
If ∀t ∈ S, M, t |= ¬Oˆ:
Then
r
Oˆ
z
= ∅
Therefore,
r
pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)
z
= JpiK ∪ (JλK ∩ ∅) = JpiK
Therefore, given (D), opt(JϕK) ⊆ JpiK
Therefore, by equation (8), M, s |= O(pi|ϕ)
Therefore, given that M, s |= ¬Oˆ, M, s |= (¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi)
Therefore, M, s |= (Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ)) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi)
From right to left:
We assume that for some arbitrary modelM = 〈S,4,V〉 and arbitrary world
s ∈ S, M, s |= (O(pi ∨ λ|ϕ) ∧ Oˆ) ∨ (O(pi|ϕ) ∧ ¬Oˆ).
There are two cases. EitherM, s |= O(pi∨λ|ϕ)∧ Oˆ orM, s |= O(pi|ϕ)∧¬Oˆ
If M, s |= O(pi ∨ λ|ϕ) ∧ Oˆ:
By Observation 1, ∀t ∈ S,M, t |= O(pi ∨ λ|ϕ) and M, t |= Oˆ.
Therefore, by equation (8), opt(JϕK) ⊆ Jpi ∨ λK.
Therefore, given
r
Oˆ
z
= S , opt(JϕK) ⊆ rpi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)z
Therefore, by equation (8), M, s |= O( (pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))|ϕ )
If M, s |= O(pi|ϕ) ∧ ¬Oˆ:
By Observation 1, ∀t ∈ S,M, t |= O(pi|ϕ) (and M, t |= ¬Oˆ ).
Therefore, by equation (8), opt(JϕK) ⊆ JpiK.
Therefore, given that JpiK ⊆ rpi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)z, opt(JϕK) ⊆ rpi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)z
Therefore, by equation (8), M, s |= O( (pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))|ϕ )
C Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The theorem can be proved by induction on the syntax of χ (Definition 1).
There are 5 cases to consider.
1. For the base case, if χ is a propositional atom, then by definition it is in
UDNF.
2. If χ = ¬χ1 then we show that if χ1 has an equivalent formula in UDNF, so
does χ. Suppose χ1 = δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δz for some z ≥ 1. By Definition 6 this is in
UDNF. Then ¬χ1 = ¬δ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬δz, where each ¬δi is of the form
¬δi = ¬αi ∨ ¬O(ϕi1|ψ
i
1) ∨ · · · ∨ ¬O(ϕ
i
n|ψ
i
n)
∨ O(ϕin+1|ψ
i
n+1) ∨ · · · ∨O(ϕ
i
n+k|ψ
i
n+k)
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The result then follows by applying the distributive law:
(γ11 ∨ · · · ∨ γ
1
n1
) ∧ (γ21 ∨ · · · ∨ γ
2
n2
) ∧ · · · ∧ (γk1 ∨ · · · ∨ γ
k
nk
)↔
∨
1≤mj≤nk,j≤k
(γ1m1 ∧ γ
2
m2
∧ · · · ∧ γkmk)
3. If χ = χ1 ∨χ2 then we show that if χ1 and χ2 have an equivalent formula in
UDNF, so does χ. Suppose χ1 ↔ χ′1 and χ2 ↔ χ
′
2 where χ
′
1 and χ
′
2 are in
UDNF (i.e. disjunctions of canonical conjunctions). Then χ = χ′1∨χ
′
2 which
is also a disjunction of canonical conjunctions and thus in UDNF.
4. If χ = O(χ1|χ2) then we show that if χ1 and χ2 have an equivalent formula
in UDNF, so does χ. In the case where both χ1 and χ2 are propositional
formulae, χ is already in UDNF. If χ1 contains a prenex formula, we can,
using Lemma 1, assume that χ1 = pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ) or χ1 = pi ∨ (λ ∧ ¬Oˆ) for
some prenex formula Oˆ. In the first case, item 15 of Lemma 2 tells us how
to remove the prenex outside the scope of the outer O, in the second case we
need item 16 to do this. Likewise, if χ2 contains a prenex, we can write χ2
either as pi∨ (λ∧Oˆ), or else as pi∨ (λ∧¬Oˆ). In the first case, we use item 14
of Lemma 2 to move the prenex outside the scope of O, and otherwise we
use item 13. We can repeat this process of removing a prenex from within
the scope of O until none are left, and finally, use the distributive law above
to bring the result in normal form.
5. If χ = χ1 then we show that if χ1 has an equivalent formula in UDNF,
so does χ. By Proposition 1 χ1 is equivalent to O(⊥|¬χ1). An equivalent
formula can be obtained by applying cases 1 to 4 above to this formula.
D Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First we note the following rules of inference that are known to be sound in
propositional logic namely the rules of hypothetical syllogism (HS), biconditional
introduction (BI), subconditional elimination (SCE), contraposition(Contra) and
substitution of provable equivalences (Subst).
If ⊢ ϕ→ ψ and ⊢ ψ → χ then ⊢ ϕ→ χ (HS)
If ⊢ ϕ→ ψ and ⊢ ψ → ϕ then ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ (BI)
If ⊢ ϕ→ (ψ → χ) and ⊢ ψ then ⊢ ψ → χ (SCE)
If ⊢ ϕ→ ψ then ⊢ ¬ψ → ¬ϕ (Contra)
If ⊢ α↔ β and ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ ϕ[β/α] (Subst)
In Subst, the notation ϕ[β/α] means the formula exactly like ϕ except that
instances of the formula α within ϕ are replaced by the formula β. SCE is a
special case of conditional elimination, where the conditional being eliminated
is part of another conditional.
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Here then is a derivation for the formula (17) in Proposition 2.
1 ⊤ PL
2 ⊤ 1, N
3 ⊤ → O(⊤|¬ϕ) CON
4 O(⊤|¬ϕ) 2, 3, MP
5 ♦¬ϕ→ (O(⊤|¬ϕ)→ P(⊤|¬ϕ)) D∗
6 ♦¬ϕ→ P(⊤|¬ϕ) 5, 4, SCE
7 ¬P(⊤|¬ϕ)→ ¬♦¬ϕ 6, Contra
8 O(⊥|¬ϕ)→ ϕ 7, DfP, S5(Dual), Subst
9 ϕ→ (¬ϕ→ ⊥) PL
10 (ϕ→ (¬ϕ→ ⊥) 9, N
11 ϕ→ (¬ϕ→ ⊥) 10, S5(K), MP
12 (¬ϕ→ ⊥)→ O((¬ϕ→ ⊥)|¬ϕ) CON
13 O((¬ϕ→ ⊥)|¬ϕ)→ (O(¬ϕ|¬ϕ)→ O(⊥|¬ϕ)) COK
14 O(¬ϕ|¬ϕ) Id
15 O((¬ϕ→ ⊥)|¬ϕ)→ O(⊥|¬ϕ) 13, 14, SCE
16 (¬ϕ→ ⊥)→ O(⊥|¬ϕ) 12, 15, HS
17 ϕ→ O(⊥|¬ϕ) 11, 16, HS
18 ϕ↔ O(⊥|¬ϕ) 8, 17, BI
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E Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. This proof uses the propositional rules of inference HS, BI and Subst
given in Appendix D.
We first derive the formula gExt (a generalisation of Ext) and gExt+ and
gExt−(two special cases of gExt):
gExt : (α↔ β)→ (O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧ α))↔ O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧ β)))
gExt+ : Oˆ→ (O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))↔ O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ))
gExt− : ¬Oˆ→ (O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))↔ O(ϕ|pi))
The derivation is as follows:
1 (α↔ β)→ ((pi ∨ (λ ∧ α))↔ (pi ∨ (λ ∧ β))) PL
2 ((α↔ β)→ ((pi ∨ (λ ∧ α))↔ (pi ∨ (λ ∧ β)))) 1, N
3 (α↔ β)→ ((pi ∨ (λ ∧ α))↔ (pi ∨ (λ ∧ β))) 2, S5(K), MP
4 ((pi ∨ (λ ∧ α))↔ (pi ∨ (λ ∧ β)))→
(O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ α)))↔ O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ β)))) Ext
5 (α↔ β)→ (O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧ α))↔ O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧ β))) 3, 4, HS
6 Oˆ→ (Oˆ↔ ⊤) PL
7 (Oˆ→ (Oˆ↔ ⊤)) 6, N
8 Oˆ→ (Oˆ↔ ⊤) 7, S5(K), MP
9 (Oˆ↔ ⊤)→ (O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))↔ O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧ ⊤))) gExt
10 λ↔ (λ ∧ ⊤) PL
11 (Oˆ↔ ⊤)→ (O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))↔ O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ)) 9, 10, Subst
12 Oˆ→ (O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))↔ O(ϕ|pi ∨ λ)) 7, 11, HS
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13 ¬Oˆ→ (Oˆ↔ ⊥) PL
14 (¬Oˆ→ (Oˆ↔ ⊥)) 13, N
15 ¬Oˆ→ (Oˆ↔ ⊥) 14, S5(K), MP
16 (Oˆ↔ ⊥)→ (O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))↔ O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧⊥))) gExt
17 pi ∨ (λ ∧ ⊥)↔ pi PL
18 (Oˆ↔ ⊥)→ (O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))↔ O(ϕ|pi)) 16, 17, Subst
19 ¬Oˆ→ (O(ϕ|pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))↔ O(ϕ|pi)) 15, 17, HS
Going back to the main lemma, to derive (18) we show that the following
sequence of formulae are provably equivalent. (Note that (19) can be derived in
a similar way, by replacing Oˆ with ¬Oˆ.):
1 O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)))
2 (Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)))) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))))
3 (Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)))) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))))
4 (Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|(pi ∨ λ))) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ))))
5 (Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|(pi ∨ λ))) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi))
6 (Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|(pi ∨ λ))) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(ϕ|pi))
2↔ 1 by substitutingO(ϕ|(pi∨(λ∧Oˆ))) for α and Oˆ for β in the propositional
tautology α↔ (β ∧ α) ∨ (¬β ∧ α)
3 ↔ 2, given that ⊢ Oˆ → Oˆ (Abs) and ⊢ Oˆ → Oˆ(T) by applying BI to
obtain ⊢ Oˆ↔ Oˆ, and then Subst.
4↔ 3, given the propositional tautology (α→ (β∧γ))↔ ((α∧β)↔ (α∧γ))
and Ext+, by successive applications of Subst.
5 ↔ 4, in a similar way, given (α → (β ∧ γ)) ↔ ((α ∧ β) ↔ (α ∧ γ)) and
Ext−, by successive applications of Subst.
6↔ 5, by given that ⊢ Oˆ↔ Oˆ and ⊢ ¬Oˆ↔ ¬Oˆ from Abs, T and BI, by
Subst.
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Next we also derive the formula gCOK (a generalisation of COK) and gCOK+
and gCOK−(two special cases of gCOK):
gCOK : (α↔ β)→ (O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ α)|ψ)→ O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ β)|ψ))
gCOK+ : Oˆ→ (O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ)→ O(pi ∨ λ|ψ))
gCOK− : ¬Oˆ→ (O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ)→ O(pi|ψ))
The derivation is as follows:
1 (α↔ β)→ (pi ∨ (λ ∧ α)↔ pi ∨ (λ ∧ β)) PL
2 ((α↔ β)→ (pi ∨ (λ ∧ α)↔ pi ∨ (λ ∧ β))) 1, N
3 (α↔ β)→ (pi ∨ (λ ∧ α)↔ pi ∨ (λ ∧ β)) 2, S5(K), MP
4 (pi ∨ (λ ∧ α)↔ pi ∨ (λ ∧ β))→
O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ α)↔ pi ∨ (λ ∧ β)|ψ) CON
5 (α↔ β)→ O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ α)↔ pi ∨ (λ ∧ β)|ψ) 3, 4.HS
6 O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ α)↔ pi ∨ (λ ∧ β)|ψ)→
(O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ α)|ψ)→ O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ β)|ψ)) COK
7 (α↔ β)→ (O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ α)|ψ)→ O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ β)|ψ)) 5, 6, HS
8 Oˆ→ (Oˆ↔ ⊤) PL
9 (Oˆ→ (Oˆ↔ ⊤)) 8, N
10 Oˆ→ (Oˆ↔ ⊤) 9, S5(K), MP
11 (Oˆ↔ ⊤)→ (O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ)→ O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ ⊤)|ψ)) gCOK
12 λ↔ (λ ∧ ⊤) PL
13 (Oˆ↔ ⊤)→ (O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ)→ O(pi ∨ λ|ψ)) 11, 12, Subst
14 Oˆ→ (O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ)→ O(pi ∨ λ|ψ)) 10, 12, HS
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15 ¬Oˆ→ (Oˆ↔ ⊥) PL
16 (¬Oˆ→ (Oˆ↔ ⊥)) 15, N
17 ¬Oˆ→ (Oˆ↔ ⊥) 16, S5(K), MP
18 (Oˆ↔ ⊥)→ (O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ)→ O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ ⊥)|ψ)) gCOK
19 pi ∨ (λ ∧ ⊥)↔ pi PL
20 (Oˆ↔ ⊥)→ (O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ)→ O(pi|ψ)) 18, 19, Subst
21 ¬Oˆ→ (O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ)→ O(pi|ψ)) 15, 18, HS
Going back to the main lemma again, to derive (20) we show that the follow-
ing sequence of formulae are provably equivalent. (Note that (21) can be derived
in a similar way, by replacing Oˆ with ¬Oˆ.):
1 O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ)
2 (Oˆ ∧O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ)) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ))
3 (Oˆ ∧O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ϕ)) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ϕ))
4 (Oˆ ∧O(pi ∨ λ|ψ)) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(pi ∨ (λ ∧ Oˆ)|ψ))
5 (Oˆ ∧O(pi ∨ λ|ψ)) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(pi|ψ))
6 (Oˆ ∧O(pi ∨ λ|ψ)) ∨ (¬Oˆ ∧O(pi|ψ))
2↔ 1 by substitutingO(ϕ|(pi∨(λ∧Oˆ))) for α and Oˆ for β in the propositional
tautology α↔ (β ∧ α) ∨ (¬β ∧ α)
3 ↔ 2, given that ⊢ Oˆ → Oˆ (Abs) and ⊢ Oˆ → Oˆ(T) by applying BI to
obtain ⊢ Oˆ↔ Oˆ, and then Subst.
4↔ 3, given the propositional tautology (α→ (β∧γ))↔ ((α∧β)↔ (α∧γ))
and COK+, by successive applications of Subst.
5 ↔ 4, in a similar way, given (α → (β ∧ γ)) ↔ ((α ∧ β) ↔ (α ∧ γ)) and
COK−, by successive applications of Subst.
6↔ 5, by given that ⊢ Oˆ↔ Oˆ and ⊢ ¬Oˆ↔ ¬Oˆ from Abs, T and BI, by
Subst.
